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We find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing 
costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985-2010. We apply 
a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self-selection problem 
of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant 
treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and 
domestic financial markets. The results are robust to changes in country sample and 
alternative estimation methodology, and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to 
build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the “risk premium” 




Numerical fiscal rules have been a popular addition to fiscal frameworks since the 
early 1990s.1 In this paper, we examine whether the adoption of such rules has had a 
beneficial impact on government borrowing costs in international and domestic credit 
markets. Given the considerable executive and legislative effort involved in the 
adoption of rules, whether or not their adoption has impacted on borrowing costs is 
pertinent. The main reason for believing that they might do so is if numerical rules 
add to fiscal policy credibility and reduce the risk premium on government debt. If 
they do, we would expect this to be reflected in lower borrowing costs in credit 
markets for governments that have adopted a rule compared to the costs for 
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governments that have not adopted a rule. In addition, we would expect government 
borrowing costs to decline even with respect to other (private sector) borrowers more 
generally. We examine these propositions in the context of developments in “spreads” 
for government borrowing in international and domestic credit markets. 
 
In the international market, government borrowing costs are represented by the spread 
between the rate at which a country borrows and the “risk free” interest rate, defined 
as the yield on long-term (10-year) US Treasury bonds. In this market, the interest 
rate paid by governments is typically higher than the yield on U.S. bonds. If the 
adoption of fiscal rules adds to policy credibility then, ceteris paribus, we would 
expect the yield the government would need to offer on its bonds to decline relative to 
the US yield—i.e., the spread on borrowing in the international market would decline. 
In the domestic market, we focus on the spread between the interest rate charged by 
domestic banks on loans to private sector entities and the interest rate at which 
governments can borrow through the issuance of short-term securities. In this market, 
the cost of borrowing by the government is typically lower than it is for private sector 
entities. Accordingly, if adopting fiscal rules reduces the risk premium on government 
borrowing, we would expect this spread to widen as the cost of borrowing by the 
government declines relative to that of private sector entities.  
 
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature on fiscal rules and borrowing 
costs. First, we deal with an important econometric issue in evaluating the effect of 
fiscal rules, which is the non-random selection of policy options that arises when a 
country’s fiscal policy regime choice is systematically correlated with a set of 
observable variables that also affect the outcomes and that can lead to biased 
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estimates. Many of the studies of the impact of fiscal rules have failed to address this 
issue. We address it by evaluating the treatment effect of numerical fiscal rules on 
borrowing costs in a panel dataset of countries, many of which have adopted 
numerical fiscal rules in recent years. Second, the little empirical evidence that has 
been published on the impact of fiscal rules on borrowing costs relates mainly to the 
experience of US states and European Union countries. In contrast, our dataset 
contains annual observations for 101 advanced and developing countries for the 
period 1985-2012, of which 44 countries adopted a numerical rule on the fiscal 
balance and/or the stock of public debt.  
 
To anticipate our baseline results, we find the average treatment effect on government 
borrowing costs of adopting a fiscal rule to be strong and robust, leading to on 
average to a reduction in the relative cost of borrowing by the government of between 
1.1-1.8 per cent of the borrowing spread in international credit markets and between 
1.2-1.9 per cent of the borrowing spread in domestic credit markets. Those countries 
that have already adopted fiscal rules, or are considering adopting them, should find 
our results encouraging. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss briefly 
some key issues in fiscal rule adoption and some of the empirical evidence on the 
impact of fiscal rules generally and on government borrowing costs in particular. 
Section III describes our methodology and data. Our empirical results are presented in 
Section IV and Section V concludes. 
 
II. FISCAL RULES: BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE 
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The increased use of fiscal rules reflects concerns about a so-called ‘deficit bias’ in 
fiscal policy that results from governments’ short sightedness and the ‘common pool’ 
problem.2 The short sightedness derives from governing party concerns about 
electoral prospects that may lead to insufficient attention being paid to longer-term 
budgetary requirements (Persson and Svensson, 1989), or to governments 
opportunistically raising spending or cutting taxes to increase their prospects for re-
election (Rogoff, 1990), or to governments raising public debt levels so as to limit 
future governments’ room for manoeuvre in fiscal policy (Alesina and Tabellini, 
1990). The common pool problem occurs because special interest groups fail to 
internalize the overall budgetary impact of their competing demands (Weingast, 
Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981; Wyplosz and Kostrup, 2010). One way to mitigate fiscal 
deficit bias is to adopt numerical fiscal rules that impose binding constraints on the 
conduct of fiscal policy. This involves setting a numerical target over some time 
period to guide fiscal policy, and the specification of a summary operational fiscal 
indicator to which the rule is applied (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). In practice, 
countries adopting fiscal rules have typically opted for rules that are linked closely to 
debt sustainability, with the most common rules specifying some measure of budget 
balance (overall balance, structural or cyclically adjusted balance, or balance ‘over 
the business cycle’), an explicit limit on, or target for, public debt, a limit on primary 
or current government spending, or a minimum level of government revenues aimed 
at boosting revenue collection and/or preventing an excessive tax burden.3 
 
 The empirical evidence on the gains from adopting fiscal rules is mixed. Several 
papers offer supporting results with respect to post-rule adoption fiscal performance, 
including: that targeting the budget balance or general government debt can have a 
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significant and sizeable impact on limiting fiscal deficits (Debrun, Moulin, Turrini, 
Ayuso-i-Casals, and Kumar, 2008); that expenditure rules can be effective in 
restraining primary spending (Deroose, Moulin, and Wierts, 2008), including by 
limiting upward pressure on expenditure due to unexpected revenue windfalls 
(Wierts, 2007); that their impact is more favourable if rules have a strong legal and 
institutional basis and are enforced strictly (von Hagen, Hallerberg, and Strauch, 
2007); and that rules can contribute to successful fiscal consolidation (Guichard, 
Kennedy, Wurzel, and Christophe, 2007). However, other studies report that 
significant breaks in fiscal performance appear to have preceded the adoption of fiscal 
rules (Caceres, Corbacho, and Medina, 2010) and that there appears to have been no 
improvement in the fiscal performance of emerging market economies that did not 
adopt them compared to those that did (Thornton, 2009). Also, there are several 
operational problems that complicate the effective implementation of fiscal rules. In 
particular: the rules need to be flexible enough to accommodate unforeseeable 
situations that may arise that would make any rule too costly to respect—for example, 
in the context of the cumulative increases in public debt in many high-income 
countries following the 2007 financial crisis; they can often be manipulated—for 
example, in estimating the cyclical correction inherent in any rule to balance the 
budget over the business cycle; they can be subject to arbitrage when, as is common 
practice, more than one fiscal rule is adopted; and they may not be effective unless 
they are complemented by a strong political commitment or by domestic budgetary 
institutions (von Hagen, Hallerberg, and Strauch, 2007; Wyplosz, 2013). 
 
Research on the impact of fiscal rules on government borrowing costs has been quite 
limited. A theoretical basis for adopting fiscal rules to reduce borrowing spreads is 
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providing in a series of papers by Hatchondo and co-authors that extend the Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981) sovereign debt default framework to include long-term debt. For 
example, Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) present a model in which governments 
issuing bonds with a duration like the average for emerging market countries face an 
interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile compared to when only 
short term debt is issued. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Padilla (2011) demonstrate the 
importance of debt dilution in accounting for the level and volatility of the interest 
rate spread paid by sovereigns;  and Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2015) show how 
introducing a fiscal rule lowers sovereign risk and generates welfare gains because the 
rule limits debt dilution.4 With the fiscal rule, lenders expect lower future government 
debt levels, which accounts for the decline in interest rates at which the government 
can borrow. Thus, for a given level of indebtedness, the government is able to borrow 
paying at a lower interest rate.  
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of fiscal rules on borrowing spreads relates almost 
exclusively to the experience of US states and some European economies. For the US, 
this evidence includes: Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) and Bayoumi, Goldstein, 
and Woglom (1995), who report that constitutional restraints to borrowing reduce the 
costs of borrowing by US states; Poterba and Rueben (1999ab), who find that rules on 
US states’ expenditure, deficits, and debt reduce their borrowing costs except when a 
state also imposes limitations on the ability to raise taxes; Poterba and Rueben (2001), 
who find that a sudden increase in the fiscal deficit raises state financing costs, but 
that the rise is smaller if the state has a strict fiscal rule; and Johnson and Kriz (2005), 
who find that numerical fiscal rules reduce borrowing costs but that the effect 
operates indirectly by improving credit ratings. For European countries, the evidence 
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includes Iara and Wolf (2014), who report that numerical rules only impact on 
borrowing costs of euro area countries at times of market stress; Heinemann, 
Osterloh, and Kalb (2014), who find that the impact of numerical rules on euro area 
countries is less important once historical fiscal preferences are considered; and Feld, 
Kalb, Moessinger, and Osterloh (2012), who find a robust negative effect of fiscal 
rules on bond spreads for Swiss cantons. 
 
In sum, many countries have adopted fiscal rules to support fiscal discipline and build 
policy credibility but the evidence that rules have strong effects in these regards is 
mixed, including on government borrowing costs. One issue with the approach taken 
in many of the empirical studies discussed above is that they typically search for rule 
effects by incorporating a fiscal rule adoption dummy into a data panel and examining 
the statistical significance and sign of the coefficient on the dummy. Although we 
also present some estimates of this type from a cross-country panel of countries that 
are broadly consistent with fiscal rules on debt and fiscal deficits leading to lower 
borrowing costs for governments in international and domestic credit markets, a 
problem with this approach is that it ignores the self-selection problem of policy that 
arises when a country’s policy choice is non-random In particular, systematic 
correlation between the policy choice and other covariates will cause the selection on 
observables problem, which can lead to biased estimates. In fact, we find evidence for 
the existence of this problem in probit estimates indicating that fiscal rule adoption is 
systematically correlated with variables such as macroeconomic performance, past 
fiscal performance, the level of financial development, and the exchange rate regime. 
In the next section, we discuss how we address the self-selection problem by making 
use of propensity score-matching methods developed in the treatment effect literature. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLGY  
A. Data 
Data on bond spreads are from Fouejieu and Roger (2013), which we have updated 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database and Bloomberg, and data 
on domestic borrowing spreads are from the World Bank’s World Development 
indicators database.5 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate borrowing spreads in the international 
and domestic credit markets, respectively, for countries with and without fiscal rules 
for the years 1985-2012. International bond spreads moved reasonably closely 
together for the rule adopting and non-rule adopting countries over the period; in the 
domestic markets, the spreads for non-rule adopting countries were substantially 
higher at times but narrowed sharply late in the sample period in line with the spreads 
for rule adopting countries.  
 
We draw on IMF (2009) and Schaechter, Kina, and Weber (2012) for a listing of 
countries that have adopted numerical fiscal rules and the dates of adoption. Data on 
annual fiscal balances is from Mauro, Romeu, Blinder, and Zaman (2015) and the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, and on public debt it is from 
Abbas, Belhocine, El Ganainy, and Horton (2010) and the WEO database; and data 
on macroeconomic variables is from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. In addition, we have drawn on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008) for the exchange rate regime classification (their 
coarse grid categorization, which ranges from 1 [least flexible] to 5 [most flexible]); 
on Hammond (2012) for information on inflation targeting adoption; and on the CIA 
Factbook for information on whether countries have federal or unitary fiscal systems. 
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Our dataset contains annual observations for 101 advanced and developing countries 
for the period 1985-2012, of which 44 countries adopted a numerical rule on the fiscal 
balance and/or the stock of public debt.  
 
B. Methodology 
a. Panel estimation 
In the previous section, we noted that past empirical studies of the impact of fiscal 
rules on borrowing spreads typically searched for fiscal rule effects by incorporating a 
fiscal rule adoption dummy into a data panel to examine the statistical significance 
and sign of the coefficient on the dummy variable. We follow this practice with our 
first set of estimates, which are based on a model that embeds a fiscal rule dummy in 
a standard model (e.g., Edwards, 1986; Bellas, Papaioannou, and Petrova, 2010; 
Baldacci, Gupta and Mati, 2011; Fouejieu and Roger, 2013) of the main determinants 
of sovereign spreads.  The model is specified as:  
 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜃𝑖 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (1) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 is country 𝑖’s country fixed effect on the sovereign risk premium, 𝜃𝑖 is the 
time fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables that effects sovereign risk, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a 
random error term. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the (0-1) dummy variable indicating adoption of a 
fiscal rule on the fiscal balance or stock of debt and several variables used commonly 
in the empirical literature. They are: the stock of public debt in relation to GDP and 
the fiscal balance in relation to GDP, which are expected to increase the risk premium 
since they raise the probability that the country will be unable or unwilling to service 
its debts; per capita GDP, because default risk has typically been greater for 
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developing than developed economies; GDP growth, which is a key indicator of 
macroeconomic stability and where higher growth is expected to reduce sovereign 
risk; inflation, where a high rate is expected to increase sovereign risk because it can 
signal the need for higher interest rates and thus an increase in the cost of capital; 
openness to international trade (measured as exports plus imports in relation to GDP), 
which is expected to increase sovereign risk because of the greater vulnerability to 
external shocks; the ratio of foreign exchange reserves in relation to GDP, which is 
expected to lower the risk premium since a country’s capacity to service its external 
debt or absorb a negative shock is improved; and exchange rate volatility (measured 
as the standard deviation of the monthly per cent change in the exchange rate), which 
is expected to be positively correlated with sovereign risk since it increases the 
uncertainty about the debt service outstanding.  
 
b. Treatment effects and selection bias 
Equation (1) gives rise to an important econometric issue in evaluating the effect of 
fiscal rules when the decision to adopt a fiscal rule framework is not random. If fiscal 
rule adoption is systematically correlated with a set of variables that also affect the 
outcomes, then we will have the selection on variables problem, which makes linear 
regression with a fiscal rule adoption dummy an unreliable method.6 At least two 
sources of endogeneity seem likely. The first is possible inverse causality between 
some covariates and borrowing spreads. For example, since fiscal policy can affect 
the sovereign risk premium, the fiscal authorities in some countries may adjust their 
fiscal and other policies to avoid increasing the sovereign risk premium. In this case, 
the fiscal position would be driven partly by the sovereign risk premium rather than 
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the converse. The second source of endogeneity could be omitted variable bias, since 
we cannot control for all the determinants of sovereign risk.  
 
To address the self-selection problem, we make use of different propensity score 
matching methods that have been developed in the treatment effect literature and have 
been applied to macroeconomic issues, for example, in a series of papers by Lin and 
Ye (2007, 2009, 2010, 2013), Glick, Guo, and Hutchinson (2006), Persson (2001), 
and recently by Thornton and Vasilakis (2017). In our case, the objective is to 
evaluate the treatment effect of numerical fiscal rules in countries that have adopted 
such a rule. To estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), we 
consider the following equation: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1]             (2) 
 
where 𝐷 is the numerical fiscal rule dummy, [𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1] is the value of the outcome 
that would have been observed if a fiscal rule adopter country had not adopted such a 
framework, and [𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1] is the outcome value that is observed in the same 
country. The difficulty in estimating 𝐴𝑇𝑇 is that the second term on the right-hand 
side 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1] is not observable. We cannot observe developments in borrowing 
spreads in a fiscal rule adopting country had it not adopted such a regime. If a 
country’s choice of fiscal policy framework was random, one could obtain 𝐴𝑇𝑇 by 
comparing the sample mean of the treatment group (fiscal rule adopters) with that of 
the control group (non-rule adopters). If the decision to adopt a fiscal rule framework 
were not random, then we would have the selection on observables problem. This can 
be addressed by making use of propensity score matching methods. The main idea of 
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matching is to use a control group to mimic a randomized experiment. The 
assumption needed to apply the matching method is the conditional independence 
assumption (𝑌0, 𝑌1 ⊥ 𝐷|𝑋), which requires that conditional on 𝑋, the outcomes be 
independent of the fiscal rule dummy. Under this assumption, Equation (2) can be 
rewritten as: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑋𝑖] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑜|𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑋𝑖]               (3) 
 
in which 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑋𝑖] is replaced with 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑜|𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑋𝑖], which is observable.  
 
One matching method would be to match the treated countries to the control countries 
with similar values of 𝑋. As the number of covariates in 𝑋 increases, matching on 𝑋 
would be difficult to implement in practice. To deal with this problem, we follow Lin 
and Ye (2007, 2009, 2010, 2013) and match the treated units and the control units on 
their propensity scores. The propensity score is the probability of policy adoption 
conditional on 𝑋 and can be estimated using a simple probit or logit model. A further 
assumption needed for the validity of propensity score matching is the common 
support assumption (𝑝(𝑋𝑖) < 1) , which requires the existence of a comparable 
control group of countries for the treated countries. When propensity score matching 
is used, the 𝐴𝑇𝑇 can be estimated as: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1, 𝑝(𝑋𝑖)] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 0, 𝑝(𝑋𝑖)]            (4) 
 
We employ four commonly used propensity score matching methods. The first is the 
nearest-neighbour matching with replacement, which matches each treated country to 
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𝑛  control countries that have the closest propensity scores. We use two nearest-
neighbour matching estimators: 𝑛=1 and 𝑛=3. The second method is radius matching, 
which performs the matching based on estimated propensity scores falling within a 
certain radius. We employ a wide radius (𝑟 = 0.05), a medium radius 𝑟 = 0.03), and 
a tight radius 𝑟 = 0.01). The third method is the kernel matching method, which 
matches a treated group country to all control group countries weighted in proportion 
to the closeness between the treated group country and the control group country. The 
final method is the regression adjusted local linear matching method.7 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
A. Panel Results 
The panels for estimating equation (1) contain up to 28 countries for international 
bond spreads and 46 countries for domestic lending spreads. The methodology is 
ordinary leas squares with fixed time and country effects. The results are reported in 
Table 1 and provide some support for a positive impact of fiscal rules on domestic 
and international borrowing costs. The fiscal rule dummies are all statistically 
significant, though only at the 10% level, with rules acting to reduce spreads in 
international credit markets and widen them in domestic credit markets. The results 
indicate that inflation, per capita GDP, and exchange rate volatility are the other key 
determinants of borrowing spreads, with the signs on the coefficients being as 
hypothesized. However, as discussed above, we suspect these results to be biased 
because of endogeneity. 
 
B. Estimating the Average Treatment Effects on borrowing costs 
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The two treatment groups in our study comprise a total of 44 advanced and 
developing economies that had adopted a numerical fiscal rule for the fiscal balance 
or for public debt by the end of 2012.8 Our control groups in both cases comprise 67 
countries that did not adopt a fiscal rule of any type. Tables 2 and 3 list the countries 
in the treatment and control groups for international bond spreads and domestic 
borrowing spreads, respectively.9  
 
Propensity scores 
The first step is to test for factors that increase the probability that a fiscal rule will be 
adopted. To this end, we employ a panel binary response model to test for factors that 
increase the probability that a fiscal rule will be adopted. In the model, the dependent 
variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a 
country 𝑖 adopted a fiscal rule in year 𝑡, and 0 otherwise.10 As there are unobserved 
characteristics, the appropriate specification is a panel probit model with random 
effects that is estimated using maximum likelihood. Our general model is: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝛽′𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾
′𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇    (4) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0; 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is an unobserved latent variable that 
describes the decision to adopt a fiscal rule, 𝛽  and 𝛾  are vectors of parameter 
estimates, 𝜇𝑖  is the unobserved random effect, uncorrelated with explanatory 
variables, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a normally, independently, and identically distributed error term with 
mean 0 and variance 1; and 𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑖  and 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑖  are, respectively, economic and 
institutional explanatory variables. Following common practice, we include a 1-year 
lag of the explanatory variables to avoid potential endogeneity.  
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The probability of adopting a fiscal rule is given as: 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑖𝜇𝑖) = 𝜙[𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖]            (5) 
 
where 𝜙(. ) is a standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
  
The economic and institutional variables that we include are drawn from of recent 
work that throws light on key factors behind a country’s decision to adopt a fiscal rule 
as summarized in Altunbaş and Thornton (2017). For example, Debrun and Kumar 
(2007) and Roubini and Sachs (1989) cite large and persistent fiscal deficits and 
growing public debt as a justification for the introduction of fiscal rules; the IMF 
(2009) reports evidence that fiscal rules tend to be introduced in countries that have 
already made progress in achieving fiscal and economic stability This literature has 
also highlighted the importance of monetary regimes in the decision to adopt a fiscal 
rule. For example, Combes, Debrun, Minea, and Tapsoba (2014) report that 
interactions between fiscal rules and inflation targets are important for policy 
outcomes with countries that combine fiscal rule adoption and inflation targeting 
delivering more disciplined macroeconomic policies than each of these institutions in 
isolation;11 Prud’homme (1995) and Webb (2004) attest to important differences in 
the conduct and outcome of fiscal policy between federal and unitary countries; and 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1991) discuss the 
impact of government deficits and public debt levels on the relative success of 
different exchange rate regimes; and Bova, Carcenac, and Guerguil (2014) report that 
fiscal rules were sometimes adopted as part of the toolkit to join currency unions.12 
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Thus, this literature suggests that the probability of a country adopting a fiscal rule is 
greater if it has a high level of public debt, if economic conditions are relatively 
stable, if it is relatively open to international trade and its exchange rate regime is 
relatively inflexible, if it is decentralized fiscally, if the monetary framework 
embraces inflation targeting, and if the country is a member of a currency union. 
Accordingly, we include in our baseline probit estimation: the ratio of public debt to 
GDP; the rate of inflation, the rate of real GDP growth, real GDP per capita; the 
relative flexibility of the exchange rate regime openness to international trade 
(exports plus imports as a per cent of GDP); and three 0-1 dummy variables to 
indicate whether a country is a federation, has adopted an inflation targeting regime, 
and is a member of a currency union. 
 
The baseline probit results are reported in the columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 and 
generally confirm our expectations. Broadly, the probability of a country adopting a 
numerical rule on the fiscal balance or the stock of public debt is greater if the stock 
of public debt, GDP growth, and GDP per capita are relatively high, the economy is 
relatively open, if an inflation targeting regime is in place, if it is a member of a 
currency union, if it is a federation, and if the exchange rate regime is relatively 
inflexible and if inflation is relatively low.  
 
Results from matching 
The estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATTs) for the relative cost of 
borrowing is reported in Tables 5 and 6 for the fiscal balance and for the public rule, 
respectively. The results for international bond spreads are in line 1 of panel A in each 
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table and those for domestic spreads are in line 1 of panel B of the tables. In the case 
of international bond spreads, the ATTs are negative, highly statistically significant 
and quite large in magnitude for both rules. The average borrowing spread narrows by 
between 1.5-1.8 per cent for the fiscal balance rule, and between 1.1-1.2 per cent for a 
rule on the public debt. That is, the international borrowing spread narrows following 
the adoption of a fiscal rule, which we interpret as reflecting a fall in the cost of 
borrowing incurred by the government in the international credit market. In the case 
of domestic borrowing spreads, the ATTs are positive, highly statistically significant, 
and quite large in magnitude for both rules, with the average borrowing spread 
widening between 1.5-1.8 per cent for the fiscal balance rule, and between 1.1-1.4 per 
cent for a rule on the public debt. That is, the domestic borrowing spread widens 
following the adoption of a fiscal rule, which we interpret as reflecting a fall in the 
cost of borrowing by the government in the domestic credit market. Thus, numerical 
fiscal rules have quantitatively statistically significant and quite large effects on 
lowering the relative cost of borrowing by governments in international and domestic 
credit markets.  
 
Robustness checks 
We carry out several robustness checks on our results.13 First, we take account of the 
fact that many countries in our sample received debt reduction over the period either 
because of multilateral debt relief initiatives or as the outcome of bilateral 
negotiations with official and private creditors. For some countries, the debt reduction 
was very large—for example, accumulating in current US dollars to the equivalent of 
over 100% of 2012 GDP.14 Debt reduction influences the recipient country’s debt 
stock and its fiscal balance because of the associated reduction in interest payments 
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and would likely bias our baseline results. Probit results including debt reduction are 
reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. The coefficients on debt reduction are 
statistically significant and negative, indicating that countries that experienced debt 
relief are less likely to adopt a fiscal rule. The associated matching results in these 
cases are reported in line 2 of panels A and B in Tables 5 and 6. There is little impact 
on the results for both type of fiscal rule: the estimated ATTs remain negative, 
statistically significant, and of a similar magnitude for international bond spreads, and 
positive, statistically significant, and of a similar magnitude for domestic borrowing 
spreads. As such, the adoption of fiscal rules has a significant impact in reducing 
elative government borrowing costs in international and domestic credit markets even 
after controlling for debt reduction. 
 
As a second robustness check, we take account of the fact that developed and 
developing economies are likely to have different institutional capabilities that might 
influence their ability to commit to or to enforce fiscal rules.15 This might result in 
bias results in favour of a positive impact from fiscal rules if the sample included an 
over-representation of high-income countries. To test for this possibility, we report 
separate results for high-income and other (developing) economies in which we 
classify “high-income” according to the World Bank’s country income classification 
criteria.16 These results are reported in lines 3 (high-income) and 4 (developing), 
respectively, of panels A and B, in Tables 5 and 6. The results by these country 
classifications confirm those for the full sample of countries: the coefficients are of 
the expected sign and are statistically significant for almost all tests for international 
and domestic spreads for both types of fiscal rule, though they are somewhat weaker 
in the case of the debt rule for developing economies where statistical significance is 
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frequently only at the 10% level. The general impression from these results is that 
high-income countries benefit slightly more than developing economies from the 
impact of fiscal rules on spreads—that is, the reduction in spreads in the international 
credit market, and the widening of spreads in the domestic credit market are 
somewhat larger for these countries. 
 
As a third robustness check, we try to adjust for the fact that, except for Greece, 
member countries of the Eurozone displayed a near zero risk spread in international 
credit markets over most of the sample period. Accordingly, in line 5 of panels A and 
B in tables 5 and 6 we report results excluding Eurozone countries from the sample. 
The results support our general conclusion as to the impact of fiscal rules on 
spreads—that is, the coefficients are of the expected sign and most remain statistically 
significant, though at times only at the 10% level. As a fourth and related robustness 
test, we exclude from the sample four countries—the US, the UK, Japan and 
Germany—for whom default risk was of negligible concern over the sample period 
(in that they consistently had the highest credit ratings) because their inclusion might 
bias the results in favour of finding an effect from fiscal rules on borrowing risk. 
These results are reported in line 6 of the two panels in tables 5 and 6 and are broadly 
in line with those for the full sample of countries.  
 
Our fifth and final robustness test is to try to account for the possibility that the 
impact of fiscal rules on borrowing spreads might only be temporary—for example, 
because a rule adopted during an administration that pushes for fiscal restraint might 
have the greatest impact on borrowing costs while that administration is in office, but 
a weaker impact later under a new administration less committed to, and less likely to 
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enforce, fiscal rules. We try to account for this possibility by limiting the sample to 
observations 5-year intervals (i.e., 1985, 1990, 1995, etc.), which should go some way 
to exposing any temporary effects of fiscal rules. These results are reported in line 7 
of the panels in tables 5 and 6 and are consistent with fiscal rules having had a long-
run impact on borrowing spreads, though the statistical significance of the coefficients 
falls to 10% in several cases.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we evaluated the treatment effects of adopting numerical fiscal rules on 
the cost of borrowing by governments in international and domestic financial markets. 
Using traditional panel estimates and different propensity score matching methods, 
we show that the adoption of a numerical rule on the fiscal balance or the stock of 
public debt resulted in large and statistically significant reduction in the relative costs 
of borrowing by governments in international and domestic financial markets. In 
international markets, the governments’ cost of borrowing falls with respect to the 
interest rate on US government bonds, and in the domestic market it falls with respect 
to the interest rate charged by domestic banks on loans to private entities. The results 
were robust to alternative country samples and alternative estimation methodology. 
We view our results as consistent with the adoption of numerical fiscal rules helping 
build policy credibility and thereby reducing the probability of government default 
and reducing the “risk premium” on government debt that compensates lenders for 
this possibility. Our results should be of interest to governments that have already 
adopted or are considering adopting numerical fiscal rules in the hope of, among other 





1. For example, the IMF (2009) estimates that by the end of 2009, 80 countries had 
adopted national and supranational numerical fiscal rules to guide fiscal policy. 
2. See Abbas, Belhocine, El Ganainy, and Horton (2010) and Mauro, Romeu, Blinder, 
and Zaman (2013) for discussions of long-run developments in fiscal deficits and 
public debt in large samples of countries. 
3. Many countries that have adopted fiscal rules have opted for more than one rule, 
with some countries having rules pertaining to a measure of budget balance and to the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
4. Debt dilution refers to the reduction in the value of existing debt triggered by the 
issuance of new long-term debt since rational investors anticipate that additional 
borrowing by future governments will increase the risk of default on long-term bonds 
issued by the current government and, thus, offer a lower price for these bonds. 
5. We are grateful to Armand Fouejieu and Scott Roger for making their database 
available. 
6. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) provide 
detailed discussions. 
7. These propensity score matching techniques are discussed in detail in Lin and Ye 
(2007). 
8. As some countries adopted numerical rules for the fiscal balance and the level of 
public debt, there is some overlap of countries in the two treatment groups.  
9. The number of countries included in the treatment and control groups is 
constrained by the limited availability of long runs of interest rate spread data in 
international and domestic credit markets. 
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10. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Baltagi (2008). 
11. Several countries in our sample shifted to inflation targeting monetary regimes, 
including Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru, and the Philippines (Hammond, 2012). 
12. Our sample includes eight countries that are members of the West Africa CFA 
currency union and five that are members of the Central Africa CFA currency zone. 
13. We are grateful to an anonymous referee of the journal for suggesting some of 
these robustness tests. 
14. Of the countries in our sample, Ethiopia, Guyana, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, and Zambia received 
debt reduction to the equivalent of over 100% of 2012 GDP during 1985-2012. 
15. We estimate a different binary response model to test for factors that increase the 
probability that a fiscal rule will be adopted for each additional robust test of ATT 
results but do not report the results for reasons of parsimony. The results are available 
on request. 
16. For example, in 2012, the last year of our sample, the World Bank country 
classification scheme listed countries with a per capita GNI of $12,615 or above as 
‘high-income.’ The countries grouped as high-income according to the Bank’s 
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